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Abstract
This study utilizes a rich data set from multiple retail chains to investigate 
the determinants of retail prices identified from marketing literature: 
wholesale price, retail competition, time elapsed since last promotion. The 
empirical results indicate that although all three factors are statistically 
significant in explaining the observed retail prices, they differ in the extent 
to which they explain retail price variation. The competing retail prices 
appear to explain more of variations in retail prices than other factors do. 
It is also found that a substantial variation in the pass-through of a brand 
exists across retailers. I also find positive cross-retail price responses, i.e., 
price reductions in competing retailers tend to lower the prices in a retailer. 
Regarding the impact of time since last promotion, the result supports the 
concavity of the effect of the variable. In terms of the direction, the overall 
effect of TLP is positive initially and then decays. 
Keywords: Retail Prices, Wholesale Prices, Retail Competition, Promotion
INTRODUCTION
Retailers of consumer packaged goods take several factors into 
account when they make decisions on product prices. Retailers’ 
pricing behaviors and their determinants have been major research 
issues among marketing researchers. According to the literature 
on retail pricing, retail prices of a brand in a repetitively purchased 
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product category are affected by several factors the sources of 
which can be classified into two major types. One major source 
of the determinants of retail prices would be the behaviors of the 
supplier of goods such as brand manufacturers and wholesalers 
who make decisions on wholesale prices and trade promotion 
activities. The other source of the determinant of retail prices would 
the profit maximizing behaviors of the retailer who would take into 
account factors such as retail inventory levels and competition 
among retailers. Prevailing retail prices would be an outcome of the 
interaction among various factors from both sources.
Regarding the impact of manufacturers’ behaviors and trade 
deals on retailer pricing, Lal, Little, and Villlas-Boas (1996) studied 
the profitability of trade promotions when retailers are allowed 
to forward buy and found that although the forward buying is 
profitable to the retailer as products are available at lower prices, 
forward buying can reduce the competition intensity among 
manufacturers which can leads to a higher level profitability for 
manufacturers than in the case where retailers’ forward buying is 
not allowed. In a setting of markets with multiproduct retailers, Lal 
and Villas-Boas (1998) showed that retailers offer the same discount 
on different products sometimes but at other times they offer a 
smaller discount on a brand with a bigger trade promotion support. 
An important observation that can be made from the results of 
theoretical models on the role of trade deals in retail pricing is 
that retailers have an incentive to forward buy for profitability and 
that retailers do not fully pass-through trade deals to consumers. 
Such prediction is well supported empirically. Besanko, Dube, and 
Gupta (2005) studies the pass-through behavior of a major U.S. 
supermarket chain for 78 products and found that pass-through 
varies substantially across products and across categories. From 
their cross-sectional study, they found that the average pass-
through rates are over 60% for 9 out of 11 categories, indicating that 
the wholesale prices and trade deals are still important determinants 
of retail prices although retailers do not fully pass-through trade 
deals. 
Some empirical studies try to describe and explain weekly 
variations in retail prices and study the impact of various factors on 
retail prices. Pesendorfer (2002) investigated sales or temporary price 
reductions in ketchup products in Springfield, Missouri and found 
that intertemporal demand effects play a role in determining retail 
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prices. That is, the demand increases as time elapses since the last 
sale and temporary price reductions in ketchup products are well 
explained by the time periods since the last promotion. Chintagunta 
(2002) studied the category pricing behavior of a retailer using an 
empirical model in which the retailer’s pricing equation is derived 
from the category profit maximization behavior. Specifically, he 
investigated the extent to which three factors affect retail prices. The 
first factor is the side payment from manufacturers to the retailer 
other than regular trade promotion. The second component is the 
retailer’s incentive to promote its own store brands in addition to the 
profit maximization incentive. The third one is retail competition and 
store traffic. He decomposed the retail price of a brand into effects 
due to wholesale prices, markup from the category profit maximizing 
behavior implied by the demand function, additional side payments, 
retail competition, and the retailer’s objectives for the store brand 
and found that the retail appears to take side payment from 
manufacturers into account when setting retail prices and to try to 
maximize the share of the store brand in addition to the category 
profit. 
This paper also aims to study empirically the determinants of 
retail prices. Specifically, it attempts to contribute to the literature 
by comparing the importance of various factors that were separately 
studies in existing studies. This study is differentiated from previous 
ones in that wholesale price, retail competition, and intertemporal 
demand effects are simultaneously considered in to explain weekly 
variations in retail prices. Unlike Shankar and Bolton (2004) who 
study retailers’ choice pricing strategy between Hi-Lo and EDLP, 
my study is interested in retailers’ weekly pricing behaviors. So this 
study looks into the issue of figuring out the relative importance of 
three major factors in retailers’ weekly pricing decisions. I identify 
three alternative views on major players in determining retail price 
variations. The first view is that manufacturers drive retail prices. 
In this view, wholesale prices would be the key determinant of 
retail prices. The second view is that competing retailers drive retail 
prices. As a retailer competes for customers with other retailers in 
the same market, the retailer should want to remain competitive in 
prices. In this view, other retailers’ prices would be the key variable 
explaining retail prices. The third view is that low value consumers 
drive retail prices. The existence of the low value consumers who 
buy on promotions only would offer an incentive for the retailer 
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to engage in price discrimination between regular consumers and 
deal-prone consumers. Thus retailers would set retail prices below 
a regular level from time to time in order to serve the low value 
segment while regular consumers are served evenly across periods. 
Therefore, in this view, the elapsed time since the recent promotion 
would determine retail prices.
While existing studies have investigated the extent that some of 
those factors drive retail prices, this study is differentiated in that 
it tries to account for three factors simultaneously. This is enabled 
by the use of a rich data set that contains information on wholesale 
prices as well as on retail prices in competing retailers. While 
Pesendorfer (2002) did not consider the impact of wholesale prices, 
this study take wholesale prices into account. In Chintagunta (2002), 
the data set is from one single retail chain and therefore competitive 
forces in retail are captured indirectly through store traffic to the 
focal retailer. Such indirect approach, however, may not capture the 
true impact of retail competition on retail pricing since store traffic 
can be influenced by factors other than competitive forces among 
retailers such as seasonality. In contrast, my study utilizes data 
from several major retailers in a market so that the impact of prices 
in other retailers is directly measured. 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section provides 
a detailed description on the data set. Then, the model and the 
empirical results are presented, followed by conclusion and 
suggestion for future research direction. 
DATA
An account level scanner data set collected in a western city 
in the United States is used for this study. The data set contains 
information on weekly chain level retail prices, wholesale prices, 
retail promotion activities of four major brands in a consumer 
packaged goods category at three competing retail chains in a 
regional market. The availability of retail prices at competing stores 
is a major feature of the data set that enables a direct assessment 
of the effect of the prices of other retailers on retail prices. There are 
114 weeks in the data set. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of 
retail prices and wholesale prices of four brands in three retailers. 
As presented in table 1, there are enough variations in retail prices 
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across weeks. Standard deviations of weekly prices are more than 
10% of the average prices for most brands. Although all brands 
in the data set are national brands, substantial variations across 
brands are also observed. Brand B1 is the most expensive among 
all brands in all retailers, 20% more expensive than the cheapest 
brand B2. I also observe substantial variations in retail prices 
across retailers. Retailer R3 tends to have lower average prices than 
others while retailers R1 and R2 have similar price levels. Average 
retail prices at retailer R3 are around 10% lower than those at other 
retailers. 
Interestingly, R3 engages in promotions less frequently than other 
retailers as shown in table 2. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
of the time elapsed since last promotion. If there is any feature or 
display activity in a week, that week is recorded as promotion week. 
Obviously, promotion frequency varies across brands. For example, 
on average, brand B1 is put on promotion in every 3.54 weeks in 
retailer R1. But it would take 13.11 weeks on average for B2 to be 
promoted in the same retailer. Retailers are homogeneous in the 
Table 1. Retail Prices and Wholesale Prices 
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sense that the order of promotion frequency among brands is quite 
consistent across retailers. That is, brand B1 and B3 are mostly 
frequently promoted while B2 is the least frequently promoted in all 
retailers. However, retailers are heterogeneous in the average level 
of promotion frequency. Retailer R3 engage in feature or display 
promotion less frequently than other retailers. It would take 7.81 
weeks for brand B1 to be promoted in R3 while R1 and R2 promote 
that brand in every 3.54 week or 4.05 week respectively. B2 is not 
promoted in R3 during the data period. Combined with retail price 
information, it can be concluded that retailer R3 has lower average 
prices and engages in feature and display promotions less frequency 
than other retailers do.
As presented in Table 1, wholesale prices are the same across 
retailers, consistent with Robinson-Patman act which requires the 
seller to offer the same price terms to customers at a given level 
of trade. That is, manufacturers or wholesalers are supposed to 
offer the same wholesale prices to all retailers in the same region. 
Wholesale prices also show enough weekly variations for most 
brands. Standard deviations are more than 10% of the average 
wholesale prices. One exception is brand B1 which has a very small 
variation in wholesale prices but a relatively large variation in retail 
prices. Brand B1 has the highest wholesale prices and B2 has the 
lowest. It appears that retailers do not make as much profit per unit 
Table 2. Time Elapsed since Last Promotion (TLP)





























































(1) There is no promotional activity for B2 in R3 during the data period.
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from B1 as they make from other brands. Price-cost margin from B1 
is around 12% at retailers R1 and R2 and it is only 2% at retailer 
R3. But price-cost margins of other brands are more than 45% in 
retailer R1 and R2, and more than 39% in the cheapest retailer R3.
Based on volume sales information, I compute within-store 
market shares among the four brands. As presented in Table 3, 
I find similar patterns in the within-store shares across retailers. 
On average, brand B3 has the highest shares, ranging from 53% to 
60%. Brand B2 is the weakest brand among the four. The average 
market shares very similar across retailers while the average retail 
prices are substantially lower in retailer R3. This implies that the 
overall lower prices at retailer R3 does not provide any advantage 
or disadvantage to any brand. More importantly, any possible 
difference in retailer pricing among retailers cannot be related to 
relative market shares among brands. 
ANALYSIS
In order to describe the weekly variations in retail prices, a 
multiplicative model is used. That is, the following regression model 
is used to capture the effects of three factors—wholesale price, retail 
competition, and low value consumers.
Table 3. Within-Chain Market Shares
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where Prjt is the retail price of brand j at retailer r during week t,
          wjt is the wholesale price of brand j during week t,
           and TLPrjt is the time elapsed since last promotion on brand j 
at retailer r.
In the model, β captures the effect of the wholesale prices on retail 
price. It measures the pass-through rate of wholesale prices on 
retail prices. I use log-log specification as done in Besanko, Dube, 
and Gupta (2005). One would expect β to be positive. The impact 
of retail competition is captured through γ. The coefficients of the 
lagged competitors’ prices, γrsj’s, are the effects of the lagged price 
of brand j at a competing retailer s on the price of the same brand 
at retailer r. Note that I use lagged retail prices as explanatory 
variables. There are two reasons for using lagged prices. First, 
it would take some time for a retailer to monitor and respond to 
competing retailers’ prices. Second, econometrically, using lagged 
prices instead of current period prices as explanatory variables 
can remove the concern of the possible simultaneity. The sign of γ 
describes the nature of the interaction among retailers. If a retailer's 
price promotion ignites price competition among retailers, γ would 
be positive. The coefficient δ captures the effect of the time elapsed 
since last promotion. I use a quadratic specification to allow for 
possible concavity or convexity in such effect. 
The estimation results of the regression model are presented in 
Table 4. As expected, the pass-through rates, β’s, are estimated in 
general to be positive. For retailers R1, the pass-through rates of B3 
and B4 are significantly positive. For retailer R2, the pass-through 
rates of B2 and B3 are positively estimated. Although the estimates 
of the pass-through rates of B2 in R1 and B4 in R2 are negative, 
they are not statistically significant. For R3, three estimates of pass-
through rates are significantly positive while the pass through of 
B2 is negative. One notable observation would be that, within a 
brand, the pass-through varies substantially across retailers. The 
pass-through of B1 is insignificant in R2 but significantly positive 
in R1 and R3 with its magnitude larger in R3 than in R2. For B2, 
the pass-through is negative in R1 and R3 but positive and more 
than 0.9 in R2. For B3 whose pass-through is significantly positive 
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in all retailers, the magnitude of the pass-through is substantially 
larger in R3 than in other retailers. The cross-retailer variation of 
the pass-through is more dramatic when it comes to brand B4. R3 
passes through the wholesale level discount of that brand more 
than it receives. A 1% discount in wholesale price of B4 would result 
in a 1.1575% discount in retail price in R3. But R1 would respond 
to such a discount in wholesale price by lowering its retail price by 
0.6541% only and R2 may not change its retail price. In summary, 
the results indicate that pass-through varies across brands within 
a retailer and across retailers within a brand. It has been already 
found by Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2005) that pass-through 
varies substantially across products and categories in a retail chain. 
In addition to their findings, my study contributes to the literature 
with additional finding that the pass-through of a brand varies 
across retailers. Unlike Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2005) who used 
data from a single retail chain, I use data from multiple chains so 
that such finding can be made. Note that the within-chain brand 
market shares do not show such variations as shown in table 2. So 
the cross-retailer variations in pass-through rates cannot be related 
to relative brand shares differences among retailers. Interestingly, 
the brand, category, or market specific variables used in the study 
by Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2005) cannot be used to explain 
such cross-retail variations because those variables are common 
to all retail chains in the same market and the within-chain brand 
shares are similar across retailers. 
Competing retailers’ prices have significant impacts on retail 
prices. Out of 24 estimates of the effect of lagged prices at competing 
retailers, γ’s, 13 estimates are significantly positive. Others are 
positive but insignificant. Thus, in general, promotions such as 
temporary price reductions in competing retailers tend to lower 
the prices in a retailer.1) Note that this result is consistent with 
the result of Chintagunta (2002) who finds that the retail prices 
are lower than the sum of wholesale prices and economic margins 
because the retailer take the store traffic into account. The finding 
of my study verifies his claim using direct information on competing 
retailers’ price showing that a retailer would lower its price if 
  1) As noted earlier, lagged prices are used to remove the possible concern of simul-
taneity. Nevertheless, I also estimate the model using current prices at competing 
retailers instead of lagged prices and find similar results. The results are avail-
able upon request.
Empirical Investigation on the Determinents of Retail Prices 147
competing retailers offer lower prices. It appears that the magnitude 
of such effects are asymmetric among retailers. For example, a 1% 
reduction in the price of B1 in R1 would lead to a 0.4180% reduction 
in the price of that brand in retailer R3 while the same discount in 
R3 would lead to a 0.1886% reduction in R1. 
The time elapsed since last promotion (TLP) also appears to affect 
retail prices. I find significant effects of TLP on retail prices for B1 
and B3 in R1. In R2, such effects are observed for B2 and B3 but 
their magnitudes are substantially smaller than in other retailers. 
Since retailer R3 does not have any promotion on B2, the effect of 
TLP cannot be assessed for B2 in R3. In the other three brands, 
the time elapsed since last promotion has a significant impact on 
the price of a brand in retailer R3. All significant estimates of δ1 are 
positive and those of δ2 are negative. Thus I find that, in general, 
when the time elapsed since last promotion affects retail prices, its 
effect tends to be concave. The absolute magnitude of δ1 is much 
larger than that of δ2 in all cases, indicating that the total effect of 
TLP is positive initially. That is, retail prices are likely to be higher 
when the last promotion was made a long time ago than when it 
was made recently. The concavity indicated by the negativity of δ2 
implies such effect decays as time elapses further. 
The signs of δ in this study might look contradictory to the results 
in Pesendorfer (2002) who finds that the probability of a sale, an 
event that a brand is priced below certain threshold, is increasing 
but concave in TLP. However, note that two major differences exist 
between two studies in the definition of the variables. First, any 
feature or display event is recorded as promotion in my study while 
a price discount or a sale is recorded as promotion in Pesendorfer 
(2002). Second, the dependent variable is the retail price itself in 
my study while Pesendorfer (2002) studies the probability of a sale. 
That is, I investigate the impact of time since last promotion on the 
continuous variation in prices without assuming a particular level of 
price threshold to define a sale event. In order to identify sale events, 
one needs to define baseline level price and sales volumes as done 
in Blattberg, Kim, and Ye (1996). Note that my study does not need 
to define sale events, which is indeed an advantage over studies that 
require identification of sales events separately. Figure 1 depicts the 
retail prices and the promotion timings of brand B1 in retailer R1. 
As depicted in the figure, prices of B1 in R1 tend to be lowest when 
they are accompanied with promotion activities. Immediately after 
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promotions, prices tends to go up and pick later as predicted by the 
estimation results. 
In order to assess the relative importance of the determinants 
of retail prices, I conduct three set of statistical tests on linear 
restriction on the regression coefficients. First, I test the restriction 
of β = 0 to check if wholesale prices indeed explain the variation 
in retail prices. Second, I test the restriction of γ = 0 to assess the 
importance of retail competition variables in explaining retail prices. 
Finally, I test the restriction of δ1 = δ2 = 0 to check if the retail price is 
affected by the time elapsed since last promotion. The test follows a 
standard Wald test procedure in which the estimated model in table 
4 is used as the full model and the restriction in the null hypothesis 
is regarded as the deviation from the full model. The F-statistics 
values and their p-values are presented in table 5. 
Since there is only one β in each regression equation, testing 
results for β in table 5 should be the same as in table 4. That is, β is 
not significant for B1 and B2 in R1 and for B1 and B4 in R2. As for 
the effect of retail competition, there are two γ's in each regression 
equation. In the joint test of two restrictions, it is found that, at 
5% level of significance, only B3 in R2 shows insignificant impact 
of retail competition. As for the effect of TLP, B4 in R1 now shows 
significant impact of retail competition at 5% level of significance 















Figure 1. Retail Price and Timing of Promotion
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although the individual test cannot reject δ1 = 0 and δ2 = 0. This 
discrepancy occurs due to the possible correlation between TLP and 
TLP2, which increases standard errors of δ1 and δ2 in the estimation. 
But there is a significant joint impact of TLP and TLP2 jointly on 
retail price. 
Overall, most of null hypotheses are rejected in table 5 indicating 
that all of three factors are significant in determining retail prices. 
Similar results are also obtained when using the test procedures 
based on loss of fit. So, regardless of the testing approach, the 
general conclusion that can be made from the formal tests of the 
restrictions would be that all three factors are relevant. In order 
to look into the gain of including additional factors, I estimate a 
few sub-models with reduced sets of explanatory variables. First, 
I estimate models with wholesale prices only. Second, models with 
competing retailers’ prices only are estimated. Finally, models 
with wholesale price and retail competition but without TLP are 
estimated. By comparing the goodness-of-fit of the sub-models, one 
can get some insights on the extent to which the dependent variable 
is explained by each type of explanatory variable. 
As presented in table 6, different variables play a major role in 
explaining the retail price fluctuation for different brand-retail 
combinations. The retail price of B1 in R1 is mostly explained by 
the prices at competing retail chains. R2 of the model S1 is 0.1122 
while that of model S2 is 0.2129 and that of the full model is 0.2968. 
This is more of the case when it comes to B2 in R1. R2 of the model 
with competitors’ price only is 0.7320 while that of the model with 
wholesale price only is 0.1380. However, when it comes to B4 in the 
same retailer, the wholesale price appears to perform better than 
competitors’ price in explaining the retail prices. Obviously, the issue 
of which type of explanatory variable leads to a larger goodness-of-fit 
is brand-specific, i.e., different variables contribute to goodness-of-
fit for different brands. Nevertheless, I compute the average R2 to get 
an idea on relative performance of different variables. The average 
R2 from the models with wholesale price only is 0.2406 while that 
from the models of competitors’ price only 0.3511. Although I do 
not present in the table, I estimate a model with TLP variables only. 
The average R2 from the models with TLP only is 0.1293. Thus 
competitors’ price leads to a larger value of R2 than wholesale price 
or TLP does in this data set. The average R2 from the models with 
wholesale price and competitors’ price is 0.4316 while the average 
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R2 from the full models is 0.4509, indicating most variations in retail 
prices can be explained by wholesale price and competitors’ price.  
SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study utilizes a rich data set to investigate the determinants 
of retail prices. From marketing literature, three important 
determinants of retail prices are identified: wholesale price, retail 
competition, time elapsed since last promotion. Since the data 
set used in this study contains information on retail prices from 
multiple retail chains competing in a regional market, I can assess 
directly the impact of competing retailers’ price on other retailers’ 
pricing without relying on indirect variables such as store traffic. 
The empirical results indicate that all three factors are significant 
in explaining the observed retail prices. Although all of three factors 
are statistically significant, they differ in the extent to which each 
factor explains retail price variation, i.e., contributions to goodness-
of-fit. It is observed that the competing retail price explains more 
of variations in retail prices than wholesale price or time since last 
promotion does.
It is also found that a substantial variation in the pass-through 
of a brand exists across retailers, which cannot be explained by the 
brand, category, or market specific variables used in Besanko, Dube, 
and Gupta (2005) as those variables are common to all retail chains 
in the same market and the observed within-chain brand shares 
are similar across retailers. I also find positive cross-retail price 
responses, i.e., promotions such as temporary price reductions in 
competing retailers tend to lower the prices in a retailer. Regarding 
the impact of time since last promotion, the result supports the 
concavity of the effect of the variable. In terms of the direction, the 
overall effect of TLP is positive initially and then decays. This result 
is contrasted with Persendorfer (2002) who investigates the effect of 
TLP on the probability of a sales.
The outcomes of this study also produces some interesting 
directions for further research. First, the finding of cross-retailer 
variation in pass-through of a brand is new and the determinants 
are yet unexplored. It would be interesting what retailer-specific 
factors are related to such variations in pass-through. Such study 
would require information from many retailers in order to generate 
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generalizeable results Related to this issue, it is found in this study 
that pass-through varies across retailers but within-chain brand 
shares are stable across retailers. So it would be a nice venue for 
further study if one can address what factors and how those factors 
are related to such phenomena. Finally it would be interesting to 
check exactly what leads to the discrepancy between my study and 
Pesendorfer (2002) on the direction of the overall effect of time since 
last promotion. 
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